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BOOK REVIEWS
he is apprehensive of the future of trusts if the idea gains ground that the
beneficiary's interest is a form of ownership of property. He is troubled with
the view taken by a majority of the House of Lords in the Archer-Shee
cases,4 which he interprets to mean that the beneficiary's interest "is some-
thing a good deal more than a jus in personam; that it, in fact, approximates
very closely to a jus in rem. . . 2' 5 To the reviewer it has seemed fairly
clear that the beneficiary's interest is something of this sort, and is none the
worse for that.6 The important question is not whether the beneficiary has a
form of ownership, whether he has rights in rein, but what the characteristics
of equitable ownership may be. In view of the differences of opinion among
American lawyers as to the nature of the interest of the beneficiary, it is
rather curious that the author should say that a difference now exists between
English and American law on this question. It is true that in the second
Archer-Shee case the House of Lords reached the conclusion that in view of
an ancient statute in the state of New York and the expert testimony offered
as to the effect of that statute, the law of New York is different from the
English law as declared in the first Archer-Shee case. It may be suggested
that even a finding by the House of Lords as to the law of the state of New
York is hardly conclusive as to "the American law" in the forty-eight states,
on a question which is largely one of juristic philosophy.
AuSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTT.*
CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES. By Frederic Campbell Woodward. Third edi-
tion, by Lawrence Vold.' West Publishing Co. 1933. Pp. xxxi, 988.
$5.50.
Mr. Vold's edition differs from Mr. Woodward's edition of 1924 in that it
gives about 317 cases in extenso and about 409 citations to and condensations
of cases in footnotes, as against 262 full cases and 266 footnote cases in the
earlier book. About ioo cases printed in full in the 1924 edition are reduced
to note form, and more than i5o new cases have been introduced by Mr. Vold.
These new cases are in large part American decisions handed down since 1924
and frequently are in construction of the Sales Act. The cases retained have
been edited to reduce their length so as to permit about forty per cent more
cases of all kinds in approximately the same number of pages. The arrange-
ment of topics differs but little from the 1924 edition. A few new groupings
are added, such as, for example, the cases on auctions, open price agreements,
and leases. The footnotes, usually longer than those of the older edition, are
_generally in digest form instead of by way of presenting problems. The refer-
ences to law review material are generous.
4 Baker v. Archer-Shee, [1927 ] A. C. 844; Archer-Shee v. Garland, [i93i]
A. C. 212.
p. 289.
6 See Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17
COL. L. REv. 269. But see Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que
Trust (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 467.
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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A wholly new feature consists of extracts from books on marketing prob-
lems and practices, including some illuminating paragraphs from Professor
Llewellyn's writings. These are attached by way of notes and inserted in an
appendix. Some of the more common commercial documents are printed in
full in the appendix. These include a conditional sales contract, bills of lading,
a trust receipt, and a lease of goods.
An examination of the whole book and a use of the first half of it with a
class during the past few weeks lead the reviewer to believe that the revision
has much to commend it. It contains more material than the old book and
guides the reader to many of the important case, statute, and law review de-
velopments since 1924. The reduction of many old cases to notes and the
inclusion of i5o new cases give freshness to the subject. In general the
changes show good judgment. The sidelights on the practical aspects of mar-
keting are in many cases useful.
Some minor adverse criticisms might be suggested. Several of the extracts
from books on business and economics seem to verge on irrelevant truism or
platitude. For example, in connection with a simple case on passage of prop-
erty under a contract for the sale of specific rice, the author quotes a Mr. Dun-
can as saying: " Goods are made and goods are handled to satisfy human
wants. The sum total of human wants is the possible market for products.
Into every consideration of every commodity therefore, enters the element
of demand. In fact, goods cannot be analysed apart from the market. There
is, therefore, a vital interrelation between the market and the product. It is
not logical to attempt to analyze a commodity simply as a thing in itself, be-
cause it is desirable only in so far as it is useful." 2 Furthermore, there are
too many cases involving mere analysis of facts and not enough decisions where
new legal principles are developed. It hardly seems necessary to use as many
as twenty-nine cases on the passage of property to specific goods and twenty-
eight on unascertained goods in order to develop the few simple rules of law
involved. Half of this material might well have been omitted and the space
given over to problems of law less fully treated, as, for example, those con-
nected with documents of title.
It seems of doubtful wisdom to use the opinions of the New York City
Court,3 the New York Supreme Court at special term 4 or at appellate term 5
when opinions of the higher appellate courts are readily obtainable for similar
purposes. Some of the older cases seem to have been emasculated in re~diting.
Thus, Frech v. Lewis 6 is shortened to such an extent that the important
waiver question is not well treated, and from Harkness v. Russell 7 is omitted
a history of the earlier debate about the validity of conditional sales.
GEORGE G. BOGERT.*
2 P. 14. 4P. 344.
3 P. 353. P. 397.
6 218 Pa. 141, 67 Atl. 45 (I9O7), reported at p. 65.
7 118 U. S. 663 (I886), reported at p. xgo.
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ropm CONDITIONAL SALEs ACT (i918).
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